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Lessons	from	Article	50:	Why	exit	clauses	should
include	penalties	for	the	seceding	state
If	Article	50	enabled	Brexit,	does	this	mean	that	exit	clauses	make	secessions	from	a
political	union	more	likely?	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	Martijn	Huysmans	and	Christophe
Crombez	demonstrate	that	exit	clauses	which	incorporate	penalties	for	the	seceding	state
can	lead	to	more	efficient	exit	decisions.	They	argue	that	further	research	into	exit	clauses
might	help	enable	efficient	exits	from	political	unions	such	as	the	EU	and	mitigate	the
problem	of	violent	secessions	from	federations.
Conceptually,	an	exit	clause	with	appropriate	penalties	for	leaving	can	enable	what	is	known	as	‘efficient	breach’.
This	means	breaking	a	contract	in	a	case	where,	adding	up	the	benefits	and	harms	to	all	parties,	it	is	efficient	to	do
so.
In	a	union	like	the	EU,	exit	would	be	efficient	if	the	costs	of	staying	to	a	given	member	exceeded	the	benefits	to	the
rest	of	the	union	if	the	member	remained.	This	could	happen	if	material	conditions	have	changed	such	that
centralised	policies	hurt	the	member	more	than	the	benefits	of	its	membership	to	others	in	the	form	of	economies	of
scale	in	government	and	trade.
Theoretically,	to	enable	efficient	exit,	one	should	impose	a	penalty	for	leaving.	The	penalty	should	be	equal	to	the
lost	benefits	for	the	remainder	of	the	union,	plus	the	transaction	costs	of	implementing	the	exit.	In	a	recent	study,
we	demonstrate	this	more	formally	in	a	model	with	two	periods,	and	an	alternative	model	in	continuous	time	–
where	exit	is	possible	at	any	time,	so	long	as	it	has	not	happened	yet.
Theresa	May	signing	the	UK’s	letter	of	notification	setting	out	the	United	Kingdom’s	intention	to	withdraw	from	the	European	Union,
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While	the	EU	is	not	a	federal	country,	federations	may	offer	a	relevant	point	of	comparison.	Looking	at	federal
constitutions	past	and	present,	none	have	exit	clauses	with	penalties,	but	several	do	have	exit	clauses.	For
instance,	the	two-island	federation	of	Saint	Kitts	and	Nevis	allows	Nevis	to	secede	by	a	two-thirds	majority.	Under
the	Good	Friday	agreement,	the	devolved	United	Kingdom	allows	Northern	Ireland	to	join	a	united	Ireland.
Historically,	the	2003	State	Union	of	Serbia	and	Montenegro	allowed	for	secession	after	a	three-year	waiting	period.
Montenegro	exercised	this	option	in	2006,	after	obtaining	more	than	the	requisite	55%	in	a	referendum.	While	the
clause	did	not	contain	an	exit	payment,	the	fact	that	the	three-year	waiting	period	was	respected	and	no	violence
occurred	suggests	that	exit	clauses	with	conditions	may	effectively	enable	smoother	exits	from	political	unions.
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Article	50	allows	for	a	costless	exit
Ever	since	it	came	into	force	with	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon,	Article	50	allows	any	EU	member	state	to	leave	the	EU.	If	no
agreement	is	reached	two	years	after	notification	of	the	intent	to	leave,	the	EU	treaties	cease	to	apply.	While	the	UK
triggered	Article	50	in	March	2017,	it	has	since	successfully	requested	multiple	extensions	to	this	two-year	period.
Article	50	does	not	specify	an	exit	penalty.	The	EU	has	argued	that	the	UK	should	pay	a	settlement,	but	this	is
related	to	prior	commitments.	An	explicit	exit	penalty	could	have	imposed	the	payment	of	membership	fees	for	a
number	of	years	after	the	exit	without	any	benefits.	An	obligation	to	pay	back	the	administrative	costs	of	exit	on	the
EU	side	could	also	have	been	included.
Since	the	UK’s	exit	from	the	EU	clearly	seems	inefficient,	one	may	blame	Article	50	as	making	exit	from	the	EU	too
easy.	And	indeed,	considering	the	theory	we	have	developed,	not	specifying	an	exit	penalty	(or	other	conditions
such	as	a	supermajority	referendum)	would	lead	to	socially	inefficient	exit	decisions.
Conclusion
Through	exit	clauses	with	penalties	for	leaving,	political	unions	such	as	the	EU	could	enable	efficient	exit	decisions.
In	the	real	world,	while	some	federations	have	exit	clauses,	none	specify	penalties.	So,	no	direct	empirical	proof	of
this	claim	is	available.	However,	the	Brexit	case	does	seem	to	illustrate	that	costless	exit	clauses	lead	to	inefficient
exit	decisions.	Furthermore,	the	issue	of	violent	secession	in	federal	countries	is	clearly	serious	enough	to	justify
more	research	into	exit	clauses.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	article	at	Constitutional	Political	Economy.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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